coinsurance, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are among the best known symbols of a new era in health care finance.
This third transformation is more difficult to define than the previous two, and it is far from completed. It may, however, prove to be the most revolutionary of the three. Certainly from the point of view of health care providers, the new methods of reimbursement have implications far greater than those stemming from the spread of private insurance or the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. The latter two movements increased demand for medical care, regularized payment and made it more secure, and increased equality of access. Neither movement, however, threatened the traditional system of organization and delivery of care. Private insurance companies were extremely loathe to challenge the behavior of physicians or hospitals, and the Medicare and Medicaid legislation stated specifically that there was to be no interference with traditional practice.
The current revolution in reimbursement starts from a different premise. The "third parties" (government and business) who have been "paying the piper" have decided to "call the tune."
Far from promising not to change the system, they frequently have change as a major objective. The primary purpose of this paper is to consider the economic and ethical implications of these changes. It will look at possible effects on patients as well as providers and on medical education and research as well as on patient care. Implications for efficiency in the allocation of resources, for distributional equity, and for other ethical problems will also be discussed. The paper begins with an analysis of why these changes have been introduced, followed by a brief discussion of their distinguishing characteristics. The next section examines their potential impact, and the final section highlights the fundamental policy issues that must be addressed by any system of health care finance.
I. Recent Changes Economic Background
Health policy traditionally encompasses three major areas: access to care, the health of the population, and the cost of care. In the 1950s and 1960s the first two concerns were dominant, Numerous health policy initiatives ranging from expansion of medical education and research to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid were undertaken with the goals of eliminating barriers to access and improving the health of the population. Costs were secondary, and frequently were not considered at all.
In these two primary areas of concern, considerable progress was achieved. Disparities in access to care across income groups and between whites and nonwhites were sharply reduced. Delays in admission to hospitals were virtually eliminated; indeed, most hospitals now report excess capacity. As surpluses of medical and surgical specialists in the larger cities developed, more physicians began to locate in smaller cities and towns. Many of these changes are directly attributable to specific health policy initiatives.
The past twenty years have also witnessed extraordinary improvements in the health of the population, including a 60 percent reduction in infant mortality (to 10 per 1,000 live births) and very large declines in age-adjusted death rates from influenza and pneumonia, heart disease, and stroke. Unlike the gains in access, it is more difficult to tie these advances in health to specific policies or programs, but it is likely that thenumerous public policy initiatives played some positive role.
As these gains were unfolding in the 1970s, the nation became increasingly aware of the high and rapidly rising cost of medical care. The health sector, which in 1950 had used only -L4 percent of the nation's output, had grown to 6.1 percent by 1965, to 9.4 percent by 1980, and to 10.8 percent by 1983. The cost problem, which had been building throughout the period, became critical in the late 1970s and the early 1980s because the economy as a whole grew very slowly while health expenditures kept increasing at an extremely rapid pace. Figure 1 shows that the annual percentage changes in gross national product and health expenditures tend to follow the same pattern. (Both series have been adjusted for inflation and population growth and smoothed with a five-year moving average.) In the late 197Os and early 1980s, however, the rate of growth of the GNP fell to less than one percent per annum while real health expenditures per capita continued to increase at more than four percent. The health care system is like an 80,000 ton ocean liner going full speed ahead; it can't be turned around on a dime. But sooner or later health spending must reflect the country's underlying economic capacity.
The problem can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2 , which shows the difference between changes in health spending and changes in the GNP. This "gap" is a measure of the rate at which labor and capital flow to the heJth sector away frcn the rest of to over 20 percent of the gross national product. It seems highly likely that the other sectors of the economy will make strenuous efforts to prevent that from happening.
Resistance to the expansion of the health sector mounts because the larger that sector is, the more it takes away from other sectors when its rate of growth exceeds that of the economy as a whole. When the health sector was only 5 percent of the Gross National Product, the large gap increased its share to 10 percent, thus taking away five percentage points from the rest of the economy. But now that the share is 10 percent of GNP, the same gap over the same number of years would raise the share to almost 20 percent, thus taking away 10 percentage points from the rest of the economy. The larger any sector is relative to the total economy, the more difficult it is for it to grow faster than the total. Even a two percent gap for 30 years would put health at 17 percent of the GNP. But a smaller gap means a slower rate of growth for the health sector unless the GNP grows very rapidly.
These overall macroeconomic considerations have had special force within the federal government and have contributed to a sense of panic, as shown in Table 1 . We see in the fifth row the familiar increase in health spending as a percentage of GNP. We also can note the federal government's increased share of health spending (row 6) and perhaps most important of all, the rise in federal health spending as a share of total federal spending (row 7). The federal government faces a tremendous deficit, now, and for several years ahead. It must hold down spending, or raise taxes appreciably. One result is a strenuous effort to curb federal spending for health.
The private sector also feels the squeeze, as may be seen in Table 2 , which highlights the growth of private health insurance premiums. Increases in these premiums in the short run are paid mostly by business corporations as employee benefits. In that sense, in the short run they come out of profits. We can see that in 1950 these premiums were less than six percent of profits, but by 1980 they were 4O percent. In the long run, these payments come out of the real compensation of employees (in the form of lower wages or higher prices). It is also relevant, therefore, to note how rapidly these premiums have risen as a share of disposable personal income. In short, there is widespread interest and concern about health spending because it looms so large in both public and private budgets.
To be sure, an increase in a sector's share of GNP need not automatically be cause for alarm. There is nothing sacred about five percent of GNP, or 10 percent. Why not 20 percent? In a dynamic market economy some sectors will grow and some will shrink as a resuat of changes in demand and supply, and if the health sector grows--so what? In general, economic theory (1) as percent of (2) 5 With such a diverse set of changes under way, it is not easy to provide a brief summary of their characteristics. Indeed, apart from a desire to contain costs, there is probably no characteristic that is common to jj new programs. There are,
however, a few features that are sufficiently general to warrant a brief discussion. There may be nothing wrong with this competitive, individualistic approach. Indeed, it may be the only way to obtain rapid change in a system that previously seemed rooted in "business as usual." Ever since Adam Smith, economists have been intrigued by the observation that an individual "by pursuing his own interest . . . frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it" (Smith, 1776) . Economists have also discovered, however, that the individualistic approach does not always lead to socially optimal results. Later in this paper we will consider some possible adverse consequences of a free market solution to problems of health insurance and health care.
Payment for individual tests, visits, days in hospital,
and the like are being replaced by global payments for an illness episode, a hospital admission, or for a year of care regardless of services used (capitation).
3.
Reimbursement rates are set prospectively rather than retrospectively. This change is often described as the end of "cost based reimbursement," but that is not the most accurate description. Costs of production will continue to play a major role in the determination of health care prices, just as they do in virtually all markets, including the most competitive. What is disappearing is the willingness of payers to pay retrospectively based on cost rather than knowing in advance what the price will be. Buyers are now negotiating in advance for a particular package of services. 
II. Implications of Recent Changes
Just as it is difficult to generalize about the characteristics of recent changes in reimbursement, it is also difficult to generalize about their likely effects. Each innovation in organization and finance has its own special thrust and its own special economic and ethical implications. 
Economic Implications
The primary purpose of recent changes in organization and finance is to slow the rate of increase in health care spending.
It seems likely that they will have this effect, at least in the short run. This will come about primarily because the incentives and constraints facing the key decision makers--physicians, hospital administrators, insurance buyers, and patients--will be different from those they faced in the past. The best example of this phenomenon is the lower hospital utilization in prepaid group practice plans [Luft, 1981] . In the past some skeptics argued that lower hospital utilization in Kaiser, the Group Health Cooperative, and other prepaid group practices was the result of patient differences. They claimed that patients who needed or wanted less hospitalization sought out the prepaid plans. However, a prospective, controlled experiment that randomly assigned patients to a prepaid plan or conventional insurance demonstrated the same difference in hospital utilization that was observed in less adequately controlled studies [Manning et al., 19814] . and other employees want good wages and working conditions, and the opportunity to provide high quality care. The trustees typically want to be associated with a high quality hospital that delivers excellent care and that enjoys a good reputation in the community. The latter may entail providing care for those in need regardless of ability to pay. All groups want the hospital to remain solvent, but in the past that was usually taken for granted.
Under the traditional system of retrospective reimbursement based on incurred costs, most of the pressures on the administrator were in the direction of improving quality regardless of the effect on cost. A reimbursement system such as Medicare's Prospective Payment System dramatically changes the balance of pressure. Under the new system there is a real prospect that the hospital will not have enough revenue to cover its costs. The need to stay solvent was always one of the implicit pressures on the administrator, but now it has become explicit. Physicians begin to realize that the increased cost of new equipment and additional personnel won't necessarily be matched by increased revenue; if the hospital is forced out of business it will not be there to receive their patients. The employees begin to realize that higher wages or greater fringe benefits cannot automatically be covered by higher charges. Faced with the prospect of deficits and even bankruptcy, the trustees start changing the questions they ask and the pressures they put on the administrator. There is nothing that can match red ink for attracting the attention of trustees of hospitals or other organizations.
Health insurance companies. Increased competition in health insurance markets will also tend to restrain the growth of expenditures for health care. Both public and private insurers are abandoning their laissez-faire attitude toward physicians and hospitals in two important ways: they are bargaining about price, and they are insisting on controls over utilization.
Individual insurance companies now have little choice in the matter because if they do not move in a cost restraining direction they will lose out to those companies that do.
Patients. Those patients who continue to have "wall-towall" coverage under conventional insurance will continue to want The growing use of deductibles and coinsurance in private insurance and government programs is likely to decrease the demand for medical care. How this will affect the quantity and price of care will depend on the sensitivity of supply to price change. In the short run, when supply is likely to be quite inelastic, the decrease in demand will result in a small decrease in quantity and large downward pressure on price. In the long run, when supply is more elastic, the primary effect of a decrease in demand will be on quantity, with a smaller effect on price. All of the above assumes no shifting of demand. If suppliers, faced with decreasing demand, can in part offset the decrease by recommending more care, the declines in quantity and price will be smaller than otherwise. Global forms of reimbursement and direct controls on utilization, however, will tend to restrain the ability of suppliers to shift demand.
Differential impacts. While the general effect of reimbursement changes is to restrain the growth of expenditures, the impact will vary for hospitals, physicians, and nurses. Most of the belt-tightening is likely to be felt by hospitals, for several reasons. First, it is tempting to try to control hospital costs because they are such a large part of the total (over 4O percent) and have been rising especially rapidly. Second, it is easier to control payments to a few thousand hospitals than to hundreds of thousands of physicians. Third, most of the demand for hospital services is generated by physician decisions. As physicians begin to realize that money spent for hospital care is money that could be spent for their services, they are likely to hospitalize patients less. At first, it will be possible to do this without seriously jeopardizing patients' health, as has been demonstrated with shorter lengths of stay and ambulatory surgery.
Hospitals are likely to try to adapt to cost controls and the decreased demand for in-patient care by diversifying into other activities, including "captive" physicians' groups, home health care services, and coninunity-based health promotion activities.
Although physicians collectively have the opportunity to protect their incomes by directing most of the restraint on spending toward hospitals, equipment manufacturers, and drug companies, they too will have to adapt in ways that many will find unpleasant. In particular, in order to cope with the new financial constraints physicians will probably have to give up some of their independence and autonomy. Increasingly they will feel the need to join group practices or other forms of organizations in order to be able to bargain with insurance companies and other purchasers of care. Also, they will increasingly feel the need for professional managers to help them function in a more competitive environment. In the process, some of their power and decision-making authority will be lost. One possibility is that B is simply more efficient than A,
i.e., the patients are identical, input prices are identical, and patient outcomes are identical, but B does a better job of producing care. In this case it is both efficient and equitable to redistribute resources, i.e., to reward the efficient and punish the inefficient.
A second possibility is that there is no difference in output, patient mix, or efficiency, but that Hospital A pays higher prices for its inputs. It may be, for example, that there is a strong union in A that has negotiated higher wages or that the administrators in A are paid higher salaries than the administrators in B. In that case there are no great efficiency gains in transferring resources, since there are no efficiency differences. The redistribution does seem to be equitable, however, unless the wage differential simply offsets a difference in the cost of living.
A third possibility is that the differences in costs are due to differences in output. Although the patient mix is the same, Hospital A uses more inputs to produce higher quality care, more amenities, and the like. In this case the redistribution may be judged equitable (there is nothing in the Medicare legislation to suggest that patients in Hospital A ought to get a higher standard of care than patients in Hospital B). The implications for efficiency are not as obvious, but the value of the marginal output of the additional resources is probably greater in B than in A.
Still another possibility is that the difference in cost is the result of differences in patient mix within the DRG. To the extent that this is the source of the cost differential, there may be no gains to efficiency or equity in redistributing resources; there may even be losses. Teaching hospitals, for instance, claim that differences in patient mix contribute to their higher costs. Some studies suggest that education and research also raise costs in hospitals that carry on these activities.
Education and research. One special area of concern is the future of support for education and research. In the past some of the funding for these efforts probably came from reimbursement for patient care. The new methods of reimbursement are designed in part to do away with this type of cross-subsidization. The buyers of care are saying "We want to pay for only the care we use; if we want to support education and/or research, we will do that separately."
It's always nice to know what you are paying for and not have to buy into "package" deals or "tie in" sales.
it is also desirable to distinguish betjeen the funding of medical education (undergraduate and postgraduate) and the funding of research. In too many discussions these two activities are treated as if they were inextricably related. This may well be true with respect to the production of education and research, but it certainly need not be true of the funding. Indeed, economic theory suggests that they should be treated differently.
Medical research often has large positive externalities, i.e., confers benefits on society as a whole that are far greater than the return to those carrying on the research. Because of these externalities the private market will do less research than is socially optimal. The case for government subsidy is very strong.
With respect to medical education, the case for government subsidy is much weaker. Most of the benefits of this education are realized by those who receive the training. There is no obvious case for subsidization to achieve the socially optimal amount. As a matter of equity, society may want to help poor students obtain access to medical education but this can be accomplished through sharply focused loans and scholarships rather than general subsidies. Although many patients might benefit from the higher quality and lower costs resulting from hospital specialization, there will be disadvantages to patients as well. There are disadvantages to being hospitalized in an unfamiliar institution or in one that is inconveniently located. In a system of specialized hospitals patients will have to weigh these disadvantages against the advantages of receiving more specialized care.
Decrease in number of soecialists. While hospitals are likely to become more specialized, the proportion of physicians who are specialists or subspecialists is likely to fall. Surgery is a good example. Under the traditional system of fee-forservice reimbursement with surgeons practicing alone or in small groups, the typical comunity has a large number of surgeons relative to the demand for operations. The average surgeon has a low workload, but high fees per procedure yield a good income.
The new reimbursement systems will shift medical practice toward large groups or other large-scale organized systems of care. As demonstrated by the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser, these groups and systems take on only as many surgeons as are needed at a full workload for each surgeon. The ones so employed continue to earn a good income, but their implicit fee per procedure is much less than in traditional practice. The low workload-high fee pattern will cease to be economically viable for most surgeons, and young physicians will be less likely to enter surgery.
Surgeons are not the only ones who will be affected. Much the same story could be told about many internal medicine subspecialties, and much the same pattern of change will emerge.
This decrease in the number of specialists who have small workloads in their specialty could simultaneously lower costs and raise the quality of care.
Ethical Concerns
The financing and delivery of health care has always posed ethical problems for health professionals and for society as a whole. Some of these problems will be exacerbated by the changes in reimbursement that are now under way, and new problems are likely to arise. They will be encountered at the level of the individual physician, among groups of physicians and hospitals, and at the coninunity and national levels.
Physician-patient relations. The pressure to make physicians more cost conscious, to practice more "cost effective" medicine, will force them to make decisions that are contrary to the imediate interests of individual patients even though these decisions may be optimal for society as a whole. The conflict can be seen in Figure 3 , which shows the marginal (additional) benefits and marginal costs associated with varying amounts of care. The vertical axis is scaled in dollars while the horizontal axis may be thought of as measuring additional tests, prescriptions, days in the hospital, physician visits, and the like for any given medical condition. The downward slope of the marginal benefit curve simply assumes that the additional benefit of additional care gets smaller as the quantity of care increases. Beyond some point (where the curve crosses the horizontal axis), additional care does the patient more harm than good. The marginal cost curve is horizontal under the simplifying assumption that each additional unit of care increases total cost by about the same amount as the preceding unit. To be sure, for any given patient there will always be great uncertainty about the benefit of any particular intervention, and there may be uncertainty about marginal costs as well: these curves should be regarded as average or expected or "best guess" results.
Given the situation portrayed in Figure 3 , what is the optimal amount of care? From a social point of view, the optimum is clearly Q., where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost (under the assumption that the marginal cost reflects the value of the resources in some alternative use). If more care than Q1 is provided, the additional cost is greater than the additional benefit. If less than Q1 is provided, the benefit of additional care is greater than its cost. physician is recommending Q1 rather than Q2, they may become less honest in describing their symptoms and condition. This loss of candor will make the physician's task more difficult.
To be sure, under the old system there was frequently an economic incentive for the physician to recommend Q3, especially for services that produced income for the physician. According to some observers, widespread insurance coverage led some (many?) physicians to recommend Q3, which is clearly neither in the best interests of the patient (even if fully insured) or of society.
These observers see the current cost containment effort as pushing physicians back from Q3 to Q2. If that is the case, there is no conflict for the ethical physician.
Relations among physicians and hospital3. Compared to most industries relations among physicians and hospitals in the same community have been marked by an unusual degree of cooperation and openness. Although they were ostensibly competing with one another, physicians have freely exchanged information, helped one another, and covered for one another; hospitals, especially the nonprofit community hospitals, have behaved in much the same way.
Indeed, one of the complaints of outside observers was that physicians and hospitals did not compete enough. Whatever rivalry existed was largely expressed in efforts to raise the quality of care, leaving the community to pick up the check.
One of the objectives of the new reimbursement methods is to increase competition among physicians and among hospitals, to transform health care into a competitive industry. Health policy, like so many other major areas of public concern, requires trade-offs between such highly valued goals as efficiency and justice, and between freedom and security. Even the best solution must fall short in one direction or another, and the more effective the solution is for one goal the greater the shortfall is likely to be for another. That is the principal reason why there is so much controversy over policy: people differ in the values they place on the various goals. Some are prepared to see society give up a good deal of efficiency to get more justice or more security while others feel that freedom is a paramount value.
The financing of health care is a classic example of an insoluble dilemma, the need to choose between the Scylla of risk aversion and the Charybdis of moral hazard. Most people do not want to run the risk of having to pay very large bills for medical care. They seek health insurance, but once they have the insurance they consume more medical care than they would without insurance, and more than is socially optimal. The cost of this additional care makes health insurance more expensive than it would otherwise be. All of this is true regardless of whether insurance is obtained privately or provided collectively through government.
A theoretical solution is for individuals, when well, to make an arrangement with the insurance company and/or the providers of care that when sick, only the socially optimal amount of care will be provided, even though the insurance nominally covers all necessary care. Prepaid group practices (such as Kaiser) and the British National Health Service can be regarded as being organized on that principle. It works, and sometimes it works very well, but it requires either some deception or a great deal of restraint. It is rational for a person who is well to want to be part of such a system, but once sick it is equally rational to want all the care that might provide some benefit. The challenge to the system is to keep the patient from getting that additional care.
In the past it may not have been too difficult to meet that challenge because much of the additional care delivered in other systems was of questionable value. But as competitive pressures drive all systems toward more stringent evaluation of the costeffectiveness of care, it will become more difficult to convince patients that they are getting the best possible care. "Low yield" medicine is not "no-yield" medicine. for the elderly or the poor or any other group and reduce the amount they are prepared to pay, there is a high probability that there will be some reduction in the quantity or quality of care received. It is usually incorrect, however, to blame the new method for the denial of care; it is the reduction in the amount of money available for reimbursement that is probably the cause.
If society wants to provide care for the poor, virtually any system of reimbursement can be used. It is not the change in reimbursement method that is denying care to the poor; the change is simply the instrument whereby a weakening of commitment to the poor is given expression.
The situation is, of course, more complicated than that.
Much of the pressure for change in reimbursement is not motivated by a desire to see the poor get less care; it is an effort to make the system more cost-effective. If that is the dominant motive, however, there is an urgent need to find ways to halt and 
